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There is an inherent tension between the often aspirational international commitments which 
states assume and the practical reality of applying them in a particular factual context. This is 
exacerbated by the more general tension which pervades international law, that of balancing 
state sovereignty with legal duties. This tension is well known to political theory and, ever 
since its first case focusing on Article 9, Kokkinakis v. Greece, 1  is well attested in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the freedom of religion or 
belief. Rather than seeing this tension as a hermeneutic tool through which to understand and 
better secure the implementation of that freedom, it has tended to be seen as a problem which 
needs to be addressed, if not eliminated.  
In order to do so, two contrasting techniques can be found in the jurisprudence relating 
to Article 9, which we shall call the “first” and “second” generation approaches. The first 
generation approach focused on the universality of the right, seeking to find a way of resolving 
the inherent tension by reference to broadly construed and generally applicable overarching 
principles, couched in the language of neutrality. The second generation approach is focused 
on subsidiarity, in the guise of the margin of appreciation, and has attained prominence through 
the 2013 Brighton Declaration and the resulting 15th Protocol to the ECHR and, at the time of 
writing, in the 2018 Copenhagen Declaration.2  However, little attempt has been made to 
																																																								
1 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, European Court of Human Rights, No. 14307/88. 
2 See https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf (accessed 1 April 2018); 
https://menneskeret.dk/sites/menneskeret.dk/files/media/dokumenter/nyheder/draft_copenhagen_declaration_05
.02.18.pdf (accessed 1 April 2018). At the time of completion of this article the final version of the Copenhagen 
Declaration was implemented on 13 April 2018. The final text is significantly watered-down and marks a 
departure from the radical and perhaps rather excessive approach to margin of appreciation and has focused on 
qualitative rather than quantitative development of margin of appreciation, judicial independence and an emphasis 
	
reconcile these approaches, which contributes to the hermeneutical confusion which pervades 
the jurisprudence and the discussions of it.   
The case-law contains ever more extreme examples of both techniques in operation, it 
often being unclear why one approach is being adopted rather than the other. But merely 
observing this disjuncture in the jurisprudence will no longer do: it needs to be addressed. 
There is increasing interest in what might be called dialogical engagement between the 
international and the national levels, in this instance, driven in part by the appreciation that it 
is better to be preventing breaches of rights than making findings of violations. If international 
jurisprudence is to guide the actions of states at the national level, then the national level needs 
to know what it must strive to achieve. Must it “be neutral” or does it have a “margin of 
appreciation” in relation to a given matter? At the moment, the state tends to find out afterwards 
– which is not really much help in securing the enjoyment of the right. Rights should not only 
be about remedies. 
This tension was latent in the Kokkinakis case but was not really picked up in the 
jurisprudence which followed. The dissenting opinions in Kokkinakis – particularly those of 
Judges Martens and Valticos – laid bare the intellectual bankruptcy of the extremes of either 
approach: Judge Martens, in the quest for what we might now call neutrality, more or less 
leaving the disputants to their own devices in order to prevent the state from becoming 
enmeshed in matters which were nothing to do with it; Judge Valticos, in which we might now 
call subsidiarity or the margin of appreciation, more or less leaving it to the state to decide what 
to do. Whilst neither represents much rights-based thinking, they share an important common 
characteristic: the need for resolution at the domestic level – but informed by what? Whereas 
the “first generation” approach explored the logic of the neutrality approach,3 the “second 
generation” approach steers towards the logic of the subsidiary approach.4 Instead of offering 
																																																								
on dialogical spaces particularly along the lines of dialogues with civil society, thematic dialogues and through 
expanding third parties’ interventions. 
3 Perhaps the culmination of that approach might be considered to be the Chamber judgement in Lautsi v. Italy; 
See also the detailed discussion about the far reaching implications of the case in Jeroen Temperman (ed.) The 
Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). 
4 See Lautsi and Others v. Italy, 18 March 2011, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), No. 
30814/06, S.A.S. v. France 1 July 2014, European Court of Human Rights, No. 43835/11; Magyar Keresztény 
Mennonita Egyház and others v. Hungary, 8 April 2014, European Court of Human Rights, No. 70945/11. See 
also Leela Forderkreis E.V. and others v. Germany, 6 November 2008, European Court of Human Rights, No. 
58911/00; Savez Crkava "RljecZcvota" and others v. Croatia, 9 December 2010, European Court of Human Rights, 
No. 7798/08; Atujer Fernandez and Caballero Garcia v. Spain, 14 June 2001, European Court of Human Rights, 
No. 53072/99; Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United Kingdom, 4 March 2014, European Court 
of Human Rights, No. 7552/09; Cumhuriyetci Egitim ve KiittiirMerkezi Vakfi v. Turkey, 2 December 2014, European 
Court of Human Rights,  No. 32093/10; Asatruarfelagid v. Iceland, 18 September 2012, European Court of Human 
Rights, No. 22897/08.  
	
a complex and robust prevention-driven balance between universality and subsidiarity, which 
is at the centre of the application of convention rights, and rather than engaging with the 
challenges of their interplay and interdependence, these recent cases have effectively used the 
margin of appreciation (the ECtHR’s technical tool for applying a concept of subsidiarity) to 
avoid the difficult practical consequences of continuing to impose a requirement of “neutrality” 
(the ECtHR’s intellectual avatar for universality).5 It is high time that the modus operandi of 
the Court was revisited and, rather than these unhelpful “either/ors”, the reality of the central 
tension be acknowledged and used to inform a more sophisticated understanding of the 
interplay between neutrality and margin of appreciation in balancing the frictions between 
universality and subsidiarity. 
  
 
2 Neutrality and the Margin of Appreciation – Balancing between Sovereignty and 
International Human Rights Commitments 
 
Ever since Kokkinakis both neutrality and the margin of appreciation have been used to protect 
the core dimensions of Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention in functioning democracies as a 
form of one-directional and primarily state-driven legal and political perfectionism. 6 
Increasingly, however, Articles 9 and 10 are being approached through the lens of the margin 
of appreciation which is becoming a means of protecting “culture”, in a manner akin to 
Bismark’s Kulturkampf, Putin’s Russian Commonwealth (Ruskij Mir) and the emerging centre-
right nationalist ideologies across the Council of Europe, including from France, through 
Hungary and Poland to Bulgaria and Turkey. This trend is reflected in cases such as Lautsi v. 
Italy 7  and S.A.S. v. France 8  (which we will refer to as paradigm examples of “Second 
Generation” cases) but the contours of which can be found in many earlier cases, such as 
																																																								
5 Ibid. 
6 We refer in a holistic fashion to a rich tradition of discourses in legal and political philosophy (Raz, Klimicka 
and Chan) which explore from different perspectives the role of the state and its interactions with non-state actors 
in the articulation of public reason, the ordering of society, and the meaning of the good life. 
7 Lautsi and Others v. Italy, 18 March 2011, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), No. 30814/06. 
8 S.A.S. v. France 1 July 2014, European Court of Human Rights, No. 43835/11. 
	
Whitehouse v. UK,9 Otto Preminger v. Austria, Wingrove v. UK,10 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey11 and 
Refah v. Turkey.12  
Resorting to the margin of appreciation in all these “second generation” cases implies 
that under certain circumstances the enjoyment of the rights provided for in Article 9, and 
sometimes Article 10, can have the effect of undermining “the good” which the majority 
approach or culture represents; – “the good” potentially being anything from constitutional 
secularism to established state religion; from a permissive liberal to conservative moral climate 
or culture; from laissez-faire to securitized; indeed, from just about anything to anything 
provided it is within the scope of what might be considered possible for a democratic society 
to embrace. Kokkinakis had already hinted that there are two possible sides in the debate – the 
individual right versus the common good, to be umpired through a prism of neutrality 
according to which the state must not take sides in theological debates and religious divisions.  
The problem with this approach always was that it failed to take into account that there 
are a broad range of approaches to the relationship between religion and the state and to the 
accommodation of freedom of religion or belief within states parties to the European 
Convention. Irrespective of the position one might take in relation to either matter, the very 
existence of such approaches means that there is in reality very little scope for the state to be 
substantively neutral since this would imply both substantive detachment from religious 
matters (separation of religion and state) and at the same time deep interest in religious matters 
in order to ensure the protection of freedom of religion or belief, reasonable accommodation 
etc. A state cannot be simultaneously disengaged from religion or belief yet also engaged with 
ensuring the enjoyment of the right from some vacuum-like position. This does not mean that 
the state cannot be procedurally neutral whilst engaging with religions on different levels, thus 
blending and balancing universality and subsidiarity within a coherent overall approach 
focused on securing the enjoyment of the substantive right. 
Perhaps the problem has been the moderate obsession with the few remaining state 
churches in European states and the compatibility of this with democratic structures of 
governance. While these state churches (and the Church of England in particular) doubtless 
appear anomalous from the point of view of prevailing systems based on disestablishment and 
separation, they can be viewed differently. Indeed, this relationship could be viewed as an 
																																																								
9 Gay News Ltd. and Lemon v. United Kingdom, 7 May 1982, European Commission of Human Rights, No. 
8710/79.  
10 Wingrove v. UK, 25 November 1996, European Court of Human Rights, No. 17419/90. 
11 Sahin v. Turkey, 10 November 2005, European Court of Human Rights (GC), No. 44774/98.  





example of good practice regarding the coexistence of a state religion with the apparatus of 
secular state governance rather than as a challenge to it. Indeed, whilst the logic of several 
Court judgments points towards the incompatibility of state churches with neutrality in matters 
of religion, the Court has never said that there is an incompatibility: indeed, it has made it clear 
that there is not.13 It is certainly not the case that this model “has to go”. Nevertheless, there 
has been considerable focus outside the Court concerning the extent to which the existence of 
established or State churches might have a disproportionate impact on freedom of religion or 
belief what a principled raison d’etre for this might be. This has been to the detriment of the 
discussion we should actually be having – which concerns what happens when a state 
(including secular states) place disproportionate emphasis on a particular religion or belief 
(including non-beliefs such as constitutional secularism) from the point of view of Convention 
rights and so reverses the Kantian-Rawlsian paradigm by giving priority to the collective good 
over the individual right? This, of course, is precisely what is threatened by the “solution” to 
the “universality-neutrality” problem created by the “first generation” approach; and by the 
“second generation” approach with its focus on subsidiarity / margin of appreciation. 
One of the most remarkable developments in terms of recasting the concept of 
neutrality in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is Lautsi v. Italy. The Court’s approach to the 
overarching tension between universality and subsidiarity has been described elsewhere as 
‘oscillating between focusing upon the potential impact which the presence of religious symbols 
within an educational environment might have on perceptions of the impartiality of the State in 
matters of religion or belief, and focusing on the substantive aspects of the overall education 
																																																								
13 Izzettin Doğan And Others v. Turkey 26 April 2016, European Court of Human Rights, No. 62649/10; Lemon 
v. UK; Ásatrúarfélagid v. Iceland, 18 September 2012, European Court of Human Rights, No. 22897/08; 
Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, 18 February 1999, European Court of Human Rights (GC), No. 24645/94; 
Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, European Court of Human Rights, No. 13470/87; 
Wingrove v. United Kingdom; Darby v. Sweden, European Commission of Human Rights, No. 11581/85; Angeleni 
v. Sweden, 3 December 1986, European Commission of Human Rights, No. 10491/83; Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve 
Kültür Merkezi Vakfi v. Turkey, 2 December 2014, European Court of Human Rights, No. 32093/10; Svyato-
Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 14 June 2007, European Court of Human Rights, No. 77703/01; Holy Synod 
Of The Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. Bulgaria, 22 January 2009, European 
Court of Human Rights, Nos. 412/03 and 35677/04; Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 
14 December 2001, European Court of Human Rights, No. 45701/99; Manoussakis v. Greece, 26 September 
1996, European Court of Human Rights, No. 18748/91; Folgerø v. Norway, 29 June 2007, European Court of 
Human Rights (GC), No. 15472/02; Alexandridis v. Greece, 21 February 2008, European Court of Human Rights,  
No. 19516/06; Vergos v. Greece, 24 June 2004, European Court of Human Rights, No. 65501/01; The Canea 
Catholic Church v. Greece, 16 December 1997, European Court of Human Rights, No. 25528/94; Hasan & Eylem 
Zengin v. Turkey, 9 October 2007, European Court of Human Rights, No. 1448/04; Leela Förderkreis E.V. v. 
Germany. See also Françoise Tulkens, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Church-State Relations 





experience provided within the educational environment.’14 As has also been mentioned, in 
some way this judgment marks a significant turning point in the jurisprudence, away from the 
plethora of “first generation” neutrality oriented cases concerning registration and the 
protection of minority religions and towards “second generation” cases attempting to reconcile 
state neutrality with the protection of a majority culture. The Grand Chamber implicitly 
endorsed the view that the principle of neutrality does not demand the absence of religious 
symbolism in the state educational setting and rejected the view that the “public realm” needs 
be a “religiously neutral space” in order for a state to fulfill its “duty of neutrality and 
impartiality”.15 As has been said,  
The State can be ‘neutral and impartial’ whilst ‘perpetuating’ the traditional place of 
religions in the public life of the country. Indeed, it can do more, since the Court 
expressly acknowledges that ‘respect’ implies ‘some positive obligation on the part of 
the state’. If this means that State support for traditional religions is now within the 
margin of appreciation, then much of the recent case law of the Court may need to be 
revisited … the focus is now placed on the substance, rather than the appearance, of the 
enjoyment of the freedom of religion or belief. The Court puts it, “states have a 
responsibility for ensuring, neutrally and impartially, the exercise of various religions, 
faiths and beliefs”. It is no longer about ‘being seen to be neutral and impartial’ to the 
external observer. 16 
 
This form of neutrality is very different from that found in the earlier “first generation” cases. 
In Lautsi neutrality resembles an appeal to a form of sovereignty-driven political 
exceptionalism which is projected by the Court as being both a reflection of a subsidiarity 
principle and as a positive state duty. In a sense, it is asked to take a step back from its role as 
the “neutral and impartial organizer”: previously understood as meaning that the state was to 
ensure religious neutrality and impartiality within the State, it is now to ensure, neutrally and 
impartially, that religions and beliefs are to be enjoyed as they are found within the State.  
																																																								
14 Malcolm Evans, ‘Lautsi v. Italy: An Initial Appraisal’, 6:3 Religion & Human Rights (2011), pp. 237-244. See 
also Malcolm Evans, ‘From Cartoons to Crucifixes: Current Controversies Concerning the Freedom of Religion 
and the Freedom of Expression before the European Court of Human Rights, 26:1 Journal of Law and 
Religion (2010), pp. 345-370; Malcolm Evans, ‘Neutrality in and after Lautsi v. Italy’, in Jeroen Temperman (ed.), 
The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), pp. 329-354. 
15 Lautsi v. Italy, para. 60. 
16 Evans, supra note 14 (‘Neutrality in and after Lautsi v. Italy’), p. 353. 
	
In many ways, the recasting of neutrality in Lautsi v. Italy prepared the ground for 
S.A.S. v. France. This applied a similar approach towards the importance of respect for the 
majority culture rather than to abstract universal notions of neutrality in order to protect the 
secularist approach towards the delicate relationship between minority religious claims and 
majoritarian consensus. In a leap similar to that taken in Lautsi, in the SAS case the Court 
thought it within the State’s margin of appreciation to approach the treatment of the full-face 
veil through a lens of a state-driven political perfectionism and prohibit it because of the 
importance of facial communication in contemporary society. And with such a leap of 
jurisprudence a sociological justification feeds into the broader notion of “living together”, and 
human rights law is reduced to a reflection of pre-existing social norms.17 
The ECtHR accepted that the French full face veil ban interfered with the claimant’s 
rights to express her personality (under article 8 ECHR) and her religious beliefs (under article 
9 ECHR) but felt that this might be seen as necessary to ensure ‘(harmonious) living together’, 
stating that ‘the barrier raised by a veil concealing the face could be perceived by the 
respondent State as breaching the minimum requirements of living together’.18 However, and 
far from offering an enthusiastic endorsement of its own new concept of “living together”, the 
Court immediately expressed its concerns about using such a malleable idea as a justification 
for restricting Convention rights.19 In a strange rationale, a social expectation for a minimal 
form of social interaction has been transformed into a legal prescription which, ironically, 
probably achieves precisely the opposite of what “living together” was supposed to achieve in 
terms of harmonious coexistence, enhancing social cohesion, and improving social integration 
of minority groups. But at least French secular culture is preserved… 
This blurring of differences between socially driven and rule of law driven normativity 
bears witness to emerging fragmentation of international human rights approaches and a move 
towards more state sovereignty driven approaches. State neutrality is no longer seen as an 
hermeneutic tool which balances the inherent overarching tension between universality and 
subsidiarity, but is associated with that universality and so loses its traction as a tool with the 
move towards subsidiarity and, in European terms, a margin of appreciation acting as a vehicle 
for the transforms of social norms into legal doctrines. 
																																																								
17 Myriam Hunter-Henin, ‘Living Together in an Age of Religious Diversity: Lessons from Baby Loup and SAS’, 
4:1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2015), pp. 99-100. 
18 S.A.S. v. France, paras. 121 and 122 See also Henin, ibid. 





One might say that this amounts to a “hostile takeover” of the rights-based approach in 
the interests of established societal interests, which marginalises and trivialises the complex 
interdependencies between the political and the social. Taken a step further, the requirements 
of living together could easily justify the State pursuing a policy of “cultured neutrality”, to be 
achieved through the legal enforcement of social conventions.20  
In such “second generation” judgments something which is perceived sociologically as 
a common value acquires an independent normative status when confronted with a “deviant” 
minority practice, justified on the basis of an understanding of state neutrality which legitimates 
withdrawal from rather than engagement with its international rights obligations. These 
judgments transform culture into dominant normative viewpoints and blurs the distinction 
between social and legal norms.21 In practice, these judgments sanction another form of a 
“cultured state neutrality” shaped by a sovereignty (and State)-driven political perfectionism22 
which privileges those whose positions accord with traditional societal expectations of life in 
the public square.23 Neutrality thus becomes compatible with an exceptionalist project which 
departs from mainstream Convention approaches but which derive from the constitutional 
traditions of the country, usually significantly pre-dating the State’s ratification of the 
Convention and its assumption of Convention obligations. Looking at it from the Court’s point 
of view, it amounts to a significant departure from its earlier jurisprudence.24 
Ever since the Court’s controversial judgment in Refah Partisi v. Turkey, it has largely 
been taken for granted that the overarching aim of the “Convention Project” has been to ensure 
that the Convention is interpreted and applied in accordance with the principles of democracy 
																																																								
20 Hunter-Henin, supra note 17. See also Michel Troper, ‘French Secularism or Laïcité’, 21 Cardozo Law Review 
1267 (1999-2000), at p. 1268.  
21 In Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and others v. Hungary, para. 91, the ECtHR seems to move away 
from its jurisprudence on state interference and registration of religious associations. In this case the Court 
proposed that there is no right under the Convention, for the communities, to claim a specific legal status. 
22 In Leela Forderkreis E.V. and others v. Germany, the ECtHR assumed that labeling religious associations as 
sects had involved an interference with Article 9 rights, as the terms used to describe the applicant movement may 
have had negative consequences for them. But it held that no violation of that article had taken place, as States 
are entitled to verify whether a movement or association carries on activities which are harmful to the population 
or to public safety. See also Magyar Kereszteny Mennonita Egyhdz and others v. Hungary, dissenting opinion of 
Judge Spano joined by Judge Raimondi. 
23 Ibid., para. 100. 
24 See Savez Crkava "RljecZcvota" and others v. Croatia, para. 89: ‘the conclusion of agreements between the State 
and a particular religious community establishing a special regime in favour of the latter does not, in principle, 
contravene the requirements of Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention, provided that there is an objective and 
reasonable justification for the difference in treatment and that similar agreements may be entered into by other 
religious communities wishing to do so’. See also Atujer Fernandez and Caballero Garcia v. Spain; Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United Kingdom; Cumhuriyetci Egitim ve KiittiirMerkezi Vakfi v. Turkey, stating that 
there was a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9; Asatruarfelagid v. Iceland, para. 34; 
Magyar Kereszteny Mennonita Egyhdz and others v. Hungary, para. 113. 
	
and toleration – and, indeed, this resonates with the motivations of the founders of both the 
Council of Europe and the drafters of the ECHR itself. 
In the context of Article 9, this meant that political and religious ideas perceived as 
undermining the constitutional order of a member state might not be protected by the 
Convention, something with is also expressly provided for by Article 17. Such an approach has 
also sat uneasily alongside an understanding of neutrality in which the state is the “neutral 
organizer” sitting on the fence, as it were, while “holding the ring” whilst others engage in the 
articulation of public reason in a free and open market of ideas (one of many plausible forms 
of the exercise of neutrality). For neither the Convention nor the Court has been coy when it 
comes to defending political beliefs which, rightly or wrongly, are considered foundational to 
the relevant constitutional order, or confronting beliefs which, again rightly or wrongly, are 
considered to threaten them.  
Seen through such a lens, neutrality becomes a device for defending those things which, 
rightly or wrongly, are considered central to the existential state, rather than as an approach to 
the unbiased adjudication of a particular rights-driven legal issue. This is particularly prone to 
happen when the issue at hand involves questions of religion or belief. Some meta narrative of 
perceived cosmic battles between the religious and the secular (whatever secular might be 
taken to mean) tend towards the secular being seen as intrinsic to the forms of constitutional 
democracy essential for the preservation of convention rights) whereas the religious and belief-
based viewpoint is not.25 
The reason neutrality has the potential to be biased and protectionist is partly related to 
the way neutrality and margin of appreciation interact. The Court is prepared to allow a broad 
margin of appreciation, and thus giving member states “the benefit of the doubt” when it comes 
to an increasing array of Article 9 adjudication. The limits it sets are largely related to outright 
state interference into internal religious autonomy and potentially secessionist projects.26 What 
the court has paid less attention to is the exercise of state neutrality in a way which 
demonstrates disproportionate concern for the protection of secular or cultural paradigms to 
																																																								
25 This is irrespective of whether some societies with an established religion (like the UK) may be more liberal 
and accommodating to different voices in the public sphere than other societies (like Russia, France and Turkey) 
which operate within the framework of (sometimes nominally) secular constitutions. 
26 Communist Party (KPD) v. the Federal Republic of Germany, 20 July 1957, European Commission of Human 
Rights, No. 250/57; Kalaç v. Turkey, 23 June 1997, European Court of Human Rights, No. 20704/92; Yanasik v. 
Turkey, 6 January 1993, European Commission of Human Rights, No. 14254/89; Karaduman v. Turkey, 3 May 
1993, European Commission of Human Rights, No. 16278/90; Dahlab v. Switzerland, 15 January 2001,  European 
Court of Human Rights, No. 42393/98; Herri Batasuna v. Spain, 30 June 2009, European Court of Human Rights, 
Nos. 25803/04 & 25817/04; Vatan v. Russia, 7 October 2004, European Court of Human Rights, No. 47978/99; 
Artyomov v. Russia, 7 December 2006, European Court of Human Rights, No. 17582/05 (Admissibility). 
	
the detriment of the exercise of erstwhile Convention rights, and for the maintenance of 
established and political projects to the detriment of the novel and the challenging. 
In such “second generation” cases we see an easy linkage being made between 
spirituality and threats to national security as well as blasphemy amounting to a threat to the 
constitutional order. 27  The appeal to neutrality when coupled with a broad margin of 
appreciation is incapable of restraining either of these extremes. The post-Brighton Declaration 
ECHR has been increasingly generous with its margin of appreciation as it seeks to 
accommodate the contemptuous rejection of its jurisprudence by some states, and an emerging 
skepticism about its role in the light of its perceived overly- interventionist jurisprudence by 
others.28  
In the light of this, this question is how to relate neutrality to the margin of appreciation 
in cases where a state is attempting to bolster its secular constitutional order by 
disproportionately restricting Convention rights in the name of bolstering its constitutional and 
democratic order. Once it has yielded the margin to one state, it is difficult to reclaim it in 
relation to others with consistency and integrity.  
In the past the Court has dealt in fairly short order with cases concerning both political 
and religious movements which are thought to give rise to potential political insurgencies, 
recogising a margin of appreciation appropriate to deal with such threats.29 But can it then 
address states which choose to embrace and impose disproportionate restrictive measures in 
order to maintain and project what is a non-neutral, or at least not necessarily liberal, self-
identity? The seemingly ever broadening of the margin of appreciation post- Brighton and post-
Copenhagen in the name of subsidiarity seems to exacerbate, rather than address, this emergent 
problem. And the Court, it seems, does little to challenge this: indeed, it seems to embrace it 
as a means of solving its own crisis of legitimacy: but at what (and at whose) cost?30 It is, in 
effect, permitting the interplay between neutrality and the margin of appreciation to permit 
multiple forms of exceptionalism within Council of Europe member states and within the 
Council itself. This emerging exceptionalism exploits the perennial tension between 
universality and subsidiarity which has been embedded in the Convention from the very start 
but it does not attempt to engage with this tension as something of central importance for the 
																																																								
27 See D. Robertson, ‘The Legal Protection of Religious Values in Europe’, in J. Rodroguez (ed.), Religious 
Liberty and Secularism (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998), pp. 175-192. 
28 This is reflected in Brighton Declaration 2013 and Draft Copenhagen Declaration 2018.  
29 This case mirrors a number of early English cases starting as early as 1676 which viewed blasphemy as high 
treason, as an attack against the established religion of the land and against the constitutional foundations of the 
State. See D. Robertson, supra note 27, at p. 177. 
30 Brighton Declaration 2013. 
	
interpretation and adjudication of Convention rights, which, as Lord Hoffmann once observed, 
are universal in abstraction, but national in application.31  
It might be more honest and more effective if the Council of Europe were to embrace a 
fully-fledged US style doctrine of political exceptionalism driven by well functioning 
democraticies, with independent Courts operating in accordance with the rule of law and 
capable of protecting human rights through their existing domestic institutional frameworks.32 
This would itself require the development of comprehensive safeguards and transparent means 
of determining exceptionalism might be acceptable. But even today, much of the Council of 
Europe does not look like a family of states capable of exercising political exceptionalism in 
the adjudication of matters concerning human rights at the domestic level. Indeed, the entire 
point of an international human rights regime is that it ought to be exercising oversight of such 
applications – not absenting itself from the field on the grounds that it does not appear to be 
necessary. And the arbitrary application of the margin of appreciation, unbalanced against the 
universal norm it is legitimating departure from (for this is what the margin actually does – no 
matter how else it is described) only strengthens the trend towards “sovereintism”. A number 
of the larger states within the Council of Europe (including Russia, Turkey, France and at times 
the UK) continue to adopt ever more skeptical perspectives concerning the international legal 
order and try to shift the focus of human rights away from the protections of individuals from 
the state, towards the protection of the state from individuals. A number of smaller Council of 
Europe states have enthusiastically followed suit, though it is not always clear why. It is in 
precisely these situations that the Court has to act as the ultimate independent arbiter to ensure 
that states are truly acting in the interests of the rights holders, or else the very values which 
states purport to be protecting will be undermined. This calls for the development of urgent 
strategies towards recalibration of the work of the Court already outlined by the Brighton 
Declaration and the draft Copenhagen Declaration which must involve developing a richer 
legal understanding and culture of neutrality which engages in an appropriate fashion on 
various possible levels in which public reason keeps a dynamic balance between universality-
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judicial systems. See Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘Rebalancing European Human Rights: Has the Brighton Declaration 
















3 Civic Schisms: Neutrality in “First” and “Second Generation” Article 9 
Judgments 
 
The approach taken to neutrality in the first generation Article 9 cases was fairly consistent, 
and gave the state little scope for interference with the exercise of personal or associational 
religious autonomy under the cover of a broad margin of appreciation. The second generation 
cases, however, evidence an emerging and perhaps worrying trend that certain forms of state 
sponsored political and cultural perfectionism, when couched in the language of Article 9, are 
increasingly likely to benefit from a broader margin of appreciation than similar claims made 
by applicants. In what follows, the roots of this problem are explored and the question of 
whether this is linked to unresolved conceptual tensions within the ECtHR jurisprudence is 
considered. 
We have examined some of the features of neutrality and its relationship to margin of 
appreciation in previous publications and this chapter continues by considering how much has 
now changed.33  Our previous text explored, among other things, the then well-developed 
ECtHR jurisprudence which had established a clear blueprint for the interpretation of the duty 
of neutrality and impartiality, and which could be summarised along the following lines: the 
right to freedom of religion or belief as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any 
discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to 
express such beliefs are legitimate.34  
																																																								
33  Malcolm Evans and Peter Petkoff, ‘A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of Neutrality in the 
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debate about the scope of state neutrality in religious freedom adjudication. These include: Leni Franken, Liberal 
Neutrality and State Support for Religion (Dordrecht: Springer International Publishing, 2016), pp. 75-89; Jordi 
Ferrer Beltrán, José Juan Moreso, and Diego M. Papayannis, Neutrality and Theory of Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2013); Julie Ringelheim, ‘State Religious Neutrality as a Common European Standard? Reappraising the 
European Court of Human Rights Approach’, 6:1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2017), pp. 1-24. Another 
earlier text worth mentioning is Wojciech Sadurski, Moral Pluralism and Legal Neutrality (Dordrecht: Springer, 
1990). 
34 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000, European Court of Human Rights, No. 30985/96, para. 78; 
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova; and Serif v. Greece, 14 December 1999, European 
Court of Human Rights, No. 38178/97.  
	
The cases which have shaped the ECtHR jurisprudence in this area include a number 
of landmark cases dealing with contested leadership of religious associations. These cases 
affirm that the role of state authorities in such circumstances is to act as neutral arbiters, who 
are not to remove the causes of tension within religious associations by eliminating pluralism, 
but are to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other.35  
Has this approach been affected by moves towards “sovereigntism” in Article 9 
jurisprudence, as reflected by the recommendations calling for greater emphasis to be placed 
on subsidiarity, the margin of appreciation and for the creation of dialogical spaces for the 
ECtHR and national courts?36 Given the absence of a broad consensus concerning the scope 
of, and approaches to, the freedom of religion or belief this has always been a potential 
challenge for a consistent and coherent Article 9 jurisprudence. Historically, such tendencies 
have been tempered by the assumption that the democracy-driven infrastructure of the 
Convention would not allow wide-spread forms of “human rights exceptionalism” to develop. 
Indeed, it was widely assumed that any such tendencies would disappear after the 
reconsolidation of the Council of Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as all new member-
states recalibrated their legal systems to fully accord with the Convention. That this might not 
in fact be happening was flagged as long ago as 2002 in a Report of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe on ‘Religion and Change in Central and Eastern Europe’ 
which observed that ‘the need to guarantee religious rights and freedoms has brought the 
central and eastern European countries, which had no previous experience of democracy, face 
to face with the highly delicate problem of deciding just how far religions freedom should be 
allowed to go in a democratic society’. 37 
Since our last consideration of this, there has been a marked turn towards a state driven 
perfectionism, in which the margin of appreciation is used to permit facilitating the emergence 
of a concept of neutrality which is driven by principles of subsidiarity, rather than by other 
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36 See the text of the Brighton Declaration. 
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more universally-oriented hermeneutic principles such as proportionality and reasonable 
accommodation. The result is that neutrality has become to be seen more in terms of the 
neutrality of the Convention to the approaches taken by States to resolve tensions, rather than 
a call for neutrality in how those tensions are to be addressed by States themselves. Moreover, 
the most recent cases (which are also often driven by concerns about the ECtHR’s caseload 
and the need to rethink relationships with member states’ courts)38 the Court seems to have 
accepted the legitimacy of applying the neutrality test in this fashion not so much in relation to 
questions concerning religious autonomy and religious schisms but in relation to what could 
be described as perceived civic schisms – that is, clashes between religious and civic 
allegiances, an obvious example being the S.A.S. case. 39  In such contexts the results of 
“neutrality” are – predictably – very different. Applying such an understanding of the principle 
of neutrality to such civic schisms almost inevitably means that the Article 9 rights of individual 
applicants will be defeated. They will be trumped by acceptance by the Court of the State’s 
assertion of its policy preference under the guise of the margin of appreciation, even though it 
was the assertion of that policy preference which gave rise to the application in the first place. 
The Court, in effect, buckles before the interests of the state, potentially to the detriment of any 
number of belief or faith based conscientious objections.40 
 
 
4 Universality, Subsidiarity and Thin and Thick concepts of Neutrality 
 
One of the central features of the Kokkinakis v. Greece case which often remains hidden are 
the underlying tensions not only between universality and subsidiarity but also between liberal 
internationalism and constitutional politics, between neutrality and accommodation, between 
right and good, between neutrality and political perfectionism. As has already been indicated, 
many of these tensions are best identified in the separate and dissenting opinions.  
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by the Court in cases such as Lautsi v. Italy and Eweida v. UK. 
	
Some of the dissenting opinions in Kokkinakis clearly view proselytism as an 
aggravated threat and support the rationale of the Hellenic Constitution and the Hellenic 
Criminal Code for penalizing such conduct. As in Whitehouse v. Lemon and Lemon v. UK in 
relation to blasphemy, the argument is that proselytism undermines the constitutionally 
protected religion and so such activities may be punishable by law.41 The similarity is not 
accidental. Sherrard has reflected on the similarities between the constitutional status of the 
Church of Greece in the Hellenic Constitution and that of the established Church of England 
and how its constitutional status has more in common with the reforms of Henry VIII than with 
its Byzantine Heritage, resulting it its being described as a ‘quasi-established church.’42  
The tensions found in the dissenting judgments foreshadow the subsequent challenges 
faced by the Court in advancing state neutrality as a hermeneutical framework within which to 
consider issues arising from the existence of established or quasi-established religions in a 
number of Council of Europe member states. The complexities of secular and religious 
constitutional architectures within Council of Europe States is well known and, within the 
context of the Convention, was reflected in the travaux preparatoire and in the reservations 
made by a number of member states.43  In the Kokkinakis case it is reflected in the joint 
dissenting opinion of Judges Foighel and Loizou, the communitarian overtones of which 
implied that there was a state duty to maintain respect for established and quasi-established 
churches on the basis of this reflecting a norm of civilized societies.44 Such an approach 
suggests that maintaining the status quo is something of a conditio sine qua non for compliance 
with a state’s international obligations concerning the freedom of religion or belief.45 Just as 
the margin of appreciation justifies measures aimed at preserving the societal status quo, so 
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would it also justify upholding the constitutionally entrenched privileges of the majority faith. 
This would amount to a rather controversial application of a doctrine of neutrality.  
Clearly, the dissenting judges did not accept the admittedly controversial distinction 
between proper and improper proselytism which was drawn on in the judgment and taken 
overall their approach highlights concerns about the protection of international human rights 
in democratic states with particularist constitutions. Recognising a broad margin of 
appreciation not only highlights the lack of a pan-European consensus on the scope of freedom 
of religion or belief but it also runs the risk of creating of possible blindspots concerning the 
practices of constitutionally entrenched beliefs. Whilst this lack of consensus does indeed merit 
a more contextual approach to the freedom of religion or belief which can take account of 
diverse constitutional traditions it must also be acknowledged that there are dangers in allowing 
cosmopolitan liberal internationalism to be replaced by a sovereignty-driven human rights 
skepticism to the claims of the constitutionally unprivileged.  
 
 
5 Neutrality, the Court and the Constitution 
 
Strasbourg jurisprudence provides a treaty-based means for human rights dispute resolution 
when domestic remedies have been exhausted. It is not, however, a form of judicial review 
which can re-align the tectonic plates of a Constitution. And yet in a colloquial fashion both 
the Convention and Court’s jurisprudence are often perceived as being engaged in some form 
of “constitutional calibration”. Instead of being seen as individual decisions which contribute 
to the evolution of the Convention as a whole, Court judgments tend to be seen as a means of 
challenging and changing constitutional, quasi-constitutional questions: that is, about how 
contentious issues are being addressed within the state in question.46 This is reinforced by the 
increased use of Pilot Judgments which are intended to address questions of systemic 
concern.47  
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gradually acquired the status and authority of constitutional tribunals.’ T. Buergenthal, ‘Book Review’, 81 
American Journal of International Law (1987), at 280; ‘It is my firm conviction that if the Court continues in the 
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It is indeed the case that a great many Article 9 cases have been seen as a means of 
bringing about something of a constitutional revolution as regards approaches to the freedom 
of religion or belief within the Council in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As we have 
seen, Kokkinakis itself flagged emerging tensions between constitutional religious 
establishment and human rights protection. And whilst the “first generation” Article 9 cases 
often addressed particular disputes between religious associations and religious associations 
and the state,48 there was also a clear sense that in these cases the Court was setting out its 
vision of the type of social, political and legal environment in which such rights might thrive. 
Although, arguably, this is something the Court always does, what was distinctive about these 
cases concerning the emerging democracies in the nineties was the way in which the Court’s 
jurisprudence acted as a form of soft power aimed at the development of legal cultures based 
on democracy, rule of law and human rights. And looking at that jurisprudence today, there 
seems to be an implication that the Court thought there was greater mileage then in exercising 
such soft power in emerging democracies than it does in the older democracies today.49  
Irrespective of whether this implication is justified, it certainly seems to be the case that 
States feel less inclined to comply with unwelcome Court judgments than hitherto. It is difficult 
to reconcile this with the idea that the Court is indeed something the of a “Constitutional Court” 
for the member states of the Council of Europe. The Brighton and Draft Copenhagen 
Declarations offer a way out by seeing the Court as inhabiting a multiplicity of dialogical 
spaces, and engaging in enlightened interaction with national courts in order to inform 
reciprocal jurisprudential perspectives. Nevertheless, they identify the national courts as the 
primary drivers of change, albeit of change to be inspired by Strasbourg as far as their human 
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rights jurisprudence is concerned.50 It is far from clear how such dialogical spaces will emerge 
and work in practice but there are certainly elements in the Declarations which resemble the 
relationship between the national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union – 
including preliminary referrals and even hints of direct and indirect effect as ways of reflecting 
subsidiarity-driven approaches at a national level.51 
Kokkinakis reminds us of the tension between rights and constitutional politics but also 
highlights that the ECtHR’s jurisdiction does not directly permit the scrutiny of constitutions 
but is directed at protecting human rights beyond national remedies. But we seem to have 
arrived at a point where, in order to respond to the threat of constitutional overreach by the 
Court, the core jurisdictional competence of the Court is being progressively undermined 
through its being devolved back to the place from whence it came.  
 
 
6 Preventative Approaches the Relationship between Universality and Subsidiarity 
 
Approaching the interplay between neutrality, universality and margin of appreciation through 
the lens of prevention may offer a better a more robust approach to the tension between 
international human rights and their national implementation through domestic courts than 
doing so through the lens of subsidiarity52 Preventive approaches draw the rights-holders at 
risk into the discursive matrix, to both identify the nature of the risk and the appropriate 
																																																								
50 Brighton Declaration 2013, Section B; Draft Copenhagen Declaration 2018. 
51Lucia Serena Rossi, ‘Same Legal Value as the Treaties: Rank, Primacy, and Direct Effects of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’, 18 German Law Journal (2017), p. 771; Ester Herlin-Karnell, ‘The Function of Subsidiarity 
in Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Law: Some Preliminary Thoughts’, 1 Europarättslig Tidskrift (2017); 
Carlo Petrucci, ‘Subsidiarity in Directive 2014/104 EU on Damages Actions for Breach of EU Competition Law’, 
23:2 European Public Law (2017), pp. 395-421; Paolo G. Carozza, ‘The Problematic Applicability of Subsidiarity 
to International Law and Institutions’, 61:1 American Journal of Jurisprudence (2016), pp. 51-67; Janneke 
Gerards and Joseph Fleuren, Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the Judgments 
of the ECtHR in National Case-Law: A Comparative Analysis (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2014); Lourenço Vilhena 
de Freitas, ‘The Judicial Activism of the European Court of Justice’, in L.P. Coutinho et al. (eds.), Judicial 
Activism (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015), pp. 173-180; Takis Tridimas, The General 
Principles of EU Law (USA: Oxford University Press, 1999); Armin Von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect, 
and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law’, 6.3-
4 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2008), pp. 397-413; Sophie Robin-Olivier, ‘The Evolution of 
Direct Effect in the EU: Stocktaking, Problems, Projections’, 12:1 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law (2014), pp. 165-188; André Nollkaemper, ‘The Duality of Direct Effect of International Law’, 25:1 European 
Journal of International Law (2014), pp. 105-125. 
52  Malcolm Evans, ‘Challenging Conventional Assumptions: The Case for a Preventive Approach to the 
Protection of the Freedom of Religion or Belief’, in Malcolm Evans, Peter Petkoff, and Julian Rivers (eds.), The 




mitigating of remedial action. Taking a preventive approach would mean that the margin of 
appreciation would not, as in the current “second generation” cases, mean that domestic courts 
could just decide cases on the basis of their existing social and constitutional practices. It would 
not be biased in favour of the current “constitutional architecture” or the status quo. Rather, 
the neutrality of the state would be reflected in its focusing on securing the enjoyment of the 
right by the individuals concerned, with challenges to existing systems, structure, legislation 
or constitutions being entirely relevant – but only to the extent this was necessary for the 
effective enjoyment of the right itself and not as an abstract question of compatibility.  
An approach centered around prevention also mirrors concepts such as multicentred 
political perfectionism,53 which in this context would mean that the liberal state could cannot 
itself decide which social practices are of value, whether they need state support and what 
forms should such state support take, but must do so in conjunction with those who are affected 
by such decisions. Prevention-driven multi-centered perfectionism may reset relationships 
between international organisations and their courts, national constitutional courts (who can be 
part of the conversation rather than as an alternative fora to ECtHR)54 and ultimately “the 
minimal state” represented by the smallest group capable of effectively exercising the relevant 
decision-making role.55 A civil society needs the state to structure its functioning, but the state 
in turn requires a strong civil society to counterbalance and contain its enormous power. There 
is no deep distinction between the state and civil society in so far as individuals may be 
vulnerable to their impact, though the magnitude of that impact may vary greatly. Indeed, each 
needs the other when in in pursuit of perfectionist goals.56 
Prevention driven approaches are more likely to develop actionable policy points and 
could also be of use to the Court in determining whether to extend a margin of appreciation for 
deliberation in cases where inclusive political reasoning reflects an inclusive perfectionism – 
for example, by involved all actors. This would be that subsidiarity as reflected by a margin of 
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appreciation could only be justified if it reaches down to the minimal level necessary for 
inclusive deliberation – rather than being simply a privilege of the state. 
Such inclusive state perfectionism greatly increases the opportunities for most, if not 
all, major reasonable conceptions of the good in relation to the point at issue having a fair 
chance to be heard and reflected. While this is still a state perfectionism, it is civil society, and 
not the state as such that decides which options are (or are not) of value. Considered in this 
light, a broad margin of appreciation and state exceptionalism would only be justifiable if they 
provided safe dialogical spaces in which to develop comprehensive human rights cultures. 
Neutrality then serves to safeguard these dialogical spaces (and their outcomes) rather than act 
as a vehicle for the assertion of dominant social normative paradigms.57 Neutrality ceases to 
be an alien intrusion into a settled social space, but a descriptor of the process through which 
the outcome of dialogical process is determined. It is a means of injecting the universal into 
the local. It informs the discussion concerning the application of the margin of appreciation, 
which as a consequence ceases to be the abandonment of the universal for the local. In 
consequence, the focus will not be so much on balancing between the liberal international order 
and the inherently communitarian constitutional politics but on making human rights part of 
the articulation of public reason, rather than being the only form of public reason or a rival to 
alternative forms of public reasoning.  
In some ways, the Brighton and Copenhagen Declarations both point in that direction, 
but given the breadth of the margin of appreciation currently found in the second generation 
case-law, it is essential that any further extension or expansion is premised on the application 
of the principle of neutrality – as outlined above – as a means of ensuring an appropriate 
balance between universality and subsidiarity: the failure to do so may result in a further 
expansion of “sovereigntism” which may further erode the protections offered by Article 9. 
The complex interdependence between universality and subsidiarity is embedded in the 
very grammar of the Convention – on the one hand it is a living document which thrives and 
depends on liberal internationalism, on the other it is a document which protects and highlights 
a number of conservative values.58 As the jurisprudence concerning Article 9 demonstrates, it 
can move in either direction, or, indeed, both directions simultaneously. This dual aspect has 
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been long overlooked and the Convention has often been presented as a beacon of liberalism 
where liberal choices trump conservative ones. A quick glance through the travaux 
préparatoires indicates that this is certainly not the case – the Convention was drafted by 
conservative thinkers who sought to maintain the political status quo in a fragile western 
Europe by ensuring that a balance be maintained between the progressive and the reactionary, 
between liberal and conservative socio-political thinking. What may now be considered 
illiberal concepts by some – the protection of established religion, the right to family life and 
constitutional secularism (to name a few) – still reflect powerful strands of political thinking 
within the Council of Europe space and maintaining those delicate balances remains as relevant 
as ever for the project of ensuring political stability and liberal democracy. The Convention is 
not a “liberal” project per se. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that many in Europe have come to 
take for granted that the Convention is a tool of liberal transformation and in doing so have 
completely misjudged the resilience of political authoritarianism in its various forms (from 
both the political left and right). When it comes to balancing strong sovereignty driven and 
strong rights driven claims, it may well be that prevention driven approaches may provide a 
more useful grammar, providing the dialogical spaces where these more contested discourses 
could be articulated without being reduced to adjuncts of other political agendas. It is practical 
reflection of the views of those legal and political theorists who already argue that international 
peace and justice can only be advanced through well-governed societies.59 The difference is 
that it seeks to avoid the temptation of telling the well-governed society what to do all the time. 
Too often human rights approaches to good governance can be boiled down to meaning 
“governance by us”. It is not difficult to see why this prompts a reaction. 
The foundation of a humane global order is the stability provided by states that take 
care of their own people and respect the sovereignty of other states which do so. The complex 
and not necessarily uncontroversial appeal to strong sovereign states as guarantors of the 
international legal order is becoming rapidly a mainstream position of political theories 
endorsed by liberal, conservative and semi-authoritarian states. The complexity and the caveats 
of such an endorsement could be seen through the works of liberal thinkers like Michael 
Ignatieff who as a political theorist offers a strong endorsement to state sovereignty and as 
President of the Central European University in Budapest is presently fighting for the survival 
of his own institution which is challenged by a strong sovereignty-driven Hungarian 
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government: ‘If we want human rights to be anchored in the world, we cannot want their 
enforcement to depend on international institutions and NGOs. We want them anchored in the 
actual practice of sovereign states.’60  
The proposition that strong nation-states are crucial for the development of rights-
driven legal cultures is not merely an easily recognizable communitarian platform. Taken a 
stage further this proposition does not have to stop at the recognition of the need for strong 
sovereign states. Quite the opposite, a multi-centered political perfectionism can help ensure 
that the emphasis on sovereignty is not simply an authoritarianism in disguise. 
Tasioulas argues that such trends towards “sovereigntism” projected through the lens 
of political exceptionalism, 61  providing such exceptionalism respects commitments to 
democracy and the rule of law, may strengthen rather than weaken the interdependence 
between universality and subsidiarity. Such a project departs from communitarian proposals 
which simply accept that there are bound to be injustices in a sovereignty driven political 
project since some countries will accord more respect for human rights than others. An 
exceptionalism-driven sovereignty has to be rule of law and human rights compliant in order 
to be justifiable and the only way such compliance may be gauged is through its commitment 
and to multi-centered state perfectionism. Without well-governed sovereign nations – strong 
national communities – the global system will decay into far worse disorder, which is why 
there has to be a degree of interdependence between universality and subsidiarity. Strong 
nation-states that are solicitous of the well-being of their citizens and respectful of the 
sovereignty of other states may advance human dignity and prosperity in the world even if that 
means there is a degree of political exceptionalism. The key is that such exceptionalism is not 
at the cost of their international commitments: but this also means that those international 
commitments must be understood in a way which is compatible with such exceptionalism. 
Prevention-driven contextual application of generally applicable international commitments, 
perhaps paradoxically, may strengthen the international system, not weaken it.62  
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The 25th anniversary of Kokkinakis v. Greece reminds us of the inherent tensions between a 
universal vision and a national context. In the early years of its post-Kokkinakis jurisprudence, 
the Court took a robustly universal approach, reflected in its policy preference for the state 
being the “neutral and impartial” organizer of religious life and calling it to account when it 
acted otherwise. Over time, the logic of this approach ran into the reality of the variegated 
nature of religious life within the Council of Europe, and then into the problems not of religious 
organization but of the relationships between religions and society, then the religious individual 
and society. At this point, neutrality was a bankrupt concept: it can inform how the state is to 
behave, but it cannot inform how society is to be without making a mockery of itself. When 
states confronted questions in relation to which they cannot be substantially “neutral”, or where 
neutrality flies in the face of constitutional and/or societal norms, the response of the Court has 
been to switch towards the margin of appreciation, increasingly rationalized as an exercise in 
subsidiarity. This, however, has resulted in the state being not only the source of potential 
violations but also the arbiter of their necessity. This has led to a series of outcomes in which 
the rights of individuals have been restricted on the basis of the status quo which was being 
challenged – or, worse, on the basis of emerging reactionary trends.   
Given inherent tension in the Convention between social and political liberalism and 
conservativism, and the overarching tension between universality and subsidiarity, there is 
little obvious attraction in either a universal approach of state neutrality or the margin of 
appreciation. And a margin of appreciation to decide when not to act neutrally seems to be the 
worst possible outcome, and is roughly what we currently have.  
Against this background, this chapter has argued that neutrality can in fact play a 
valuable role in determining when it is appropriate for a state to be able to draw on the margin 
of appreciation in the context of Article 9. This is when the approach of the state to the 
application of that margin of appreciation is reflective of inclusive debate grounded in public 
reason aimed at the prevention of the alleged wrong – rather than on the unchallenged 
																																																								
Declaration 2012, Section 9 which in turn may justify wider margin of appreciation and subsidiarity-driven 
approaches. These include: Independent National Human Rights Institutions (9)(c)(i)); Scrutiny of primary 
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reaffirmation of the pre-existing status quo: a neutral application of the margin of appreciation 
by the state to the facts of the case. No more – but no less.  
